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One of the specific characteristics of the modern, sovereign state has been its mandate to collect taxes, and to administer the common treasury on behalf of the citizens of its territory. The elected politicians, in turn, decide how the common money should be spent, and they are held responsible for their actions in the next election. This arrangement goes to the heart of what makes the modern state function, and conceptually distinguishes the state from other types of political organisations that do not have the mandate to collect and administer this revenue. The significance of taxes goes beyond the rational-technical mechanisms of budgets, as it also touches upon the symbolic position of the sovereign in the history of political systems.

In April 1970, however, the member states of the European Communities agreed to grant financial independence from the member states to the Communities by endowing them with own resources​[1]​. In 1970, own resources were given both to the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, or Euratom), whereas the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been given own resources already at its creation in the Treaty of Paris from 1951; for reasons of limitations, this study is for the moment primarily concerned with the EEC. The sources of revenue would come from traditional national tax sources – various import taxes, and value-added tax – and authority to administer and decide upon the use of this revenue was handed over in large part to the Commission and European Parliament. The member state governments were still part of the Community budget procedure in the Council of Ministers, but on issues of both practical and symbolic importance, they had signed away part of their sovereignty to the European project. The 1970 decision has been crucial to the way in which the Community has been financed ever since, and it remains the financial platform of the EU today​[2]​. Yet, remarkable little scholarship exists on own resources. 

The creation of own resources for the Communities is interesting for a variety of reasons. Firstly, when the members states created own resources, they voluntarily gave up sovereignty in an area of fundamental importance to the internal functioning of the modern state. Although the actual amount of taxes given up was relatively modest in comparison with modern state budgets, the act of handing over traditional tax sources to the European project, and the long-lasting effect of this act, has both political and symbolic implications. The study therefore provides an interesting illustration of our theoretical understanding of the capacity of the post-war European state, of the creation of the system of European governance. 

Secondly, the stability of any political institution hinges on having a permanent financial solution. The ‘who pays’ discussion is revealing for the will to carry out political projects. The 1970-agreement for creating own resources came twelve years after the entering into force of the Treaties of Rome, by which time the member states had agreed to a lot of spending (the common agricultural policy in particular), but not how to finance it. Prior to 1970, the Communities were financed from member state contributions according to a key laid down in the Treaties. During the decade of the sixties, we hear about own resources primarily in relation to the debacle around the 1965-66 the empty chair crisis. This was when the French President de Gaulle withdrew high-level representation to the Community in reaction to a Commission proposal that involved the introduction of on resources, and budgetary authority to the European Parliament. What is less known, but perhaps more interesting, about the decade of the sixties and the political process of creating a permanent financing basis for the EEC, is the way in which the discussions and negotiations played out as a somewhat hidden parallel to the creation of the politically more visible projects: the CAP, the customs union, and the failed enlargement negotiations. This is an area of EU’s history that we know very little about so far​[3]​.

This paper forms part of a new research project into the origins of own resources. The serious lack of knowledge about this political process presents a major challenge to this study. The research therefore departs from an attempt to establish a narrative of the political process towards creating own resources. This narrative is based on completely new evidence from the historical archives of the Community institutions and member state administrations​[4]​. Once we have a good overview of this, we can derive policy lessons and theoretical implications. This paper puts forward the first narrative linking the politics of financing the Community to the fate of the first attempt at enlarging the Community in 1961-63. The case study is based on new investigations into multiple historical archives at the national and European levels. 






THE POLITICS OF FINANCING THE COMMUNITY, 
AND THE FATE OF THE FIRST BRITISH MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION​[5]​

The rejection of British accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) by French President Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 is to date probably the most well-researched event by historians in the EU’s history. Dominant explanations vary in emphasis on what caused the French President to throw the nascent Community into this crisis of trust.​[6]​ Thus, many agree that the British themselves were to some degree at fault because they had set conditions in the accession negotiations in key areas such as agriculture and colonial trade that France was never going to accept. Another group of explanations focus on issues internal to the accession negotiations and the Community, the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the question of how to finance the Community in the future. A third emphasis is found with those studies that stress externalities and the wider international political context, such as the French President’s dislike of the close relationship between the United States and Britain. The conclusion of the Nassau agreement shortly before the veto, so it is typically argued, accounts for the timing of the veto. Finally, some take the pragmatic route, suggesting the issues were all so interlinked that it is impossible to separate them. 

In each their different ways, these are excellent historical studies. It is important to notice, however, that they share the common trait that ultimately the explanations put forward are suggestive, deducting their conclusions from surrounding materials. Indeed they have to do so, as no historian has been able to find that final, trustworthy note where Charles de Gaulle stated what was really on his mind. His personal papers are still off limits to most historians. But it is certainly possible that that final piece of evidence never existed. President de Gaulle’s press statement on 14 January 1963, for instance, where the de facto veto was publicised, stressed a variety of reasons. It also portrayed a view of the negotiations that some of those involved were hesitant to accept. Most scholars of Europe in the sixties would agree that de Gaulle was a (melo)dramatic personality whose statements intended for the public were not always an accurate guide to his thoughts or acts. This has also left scholars divided over how to interpret his intentions and preferences.​[7]​ On the one hand stand those who believe that de Gaulle acted out of geo-strategic national interests, as state leaders in general may be expected to do, assuming that this would apply above all to a person with a military career. On the other hand are those who see the politician de Gaulle, concerned with re-election, with enforcing domestic welfare gains, and as someone who also pursued primarily economic strategies in foreign policy. These interpretations ultimately mirror debates within the realism and liberalism paradigms of international relations theory.

The purpose here is to present a new angle to the shipwrecked British accession negotiations that so far has been largely neglected by historical scholarship. The paper departs from the internal negotiations among the Six over finding a permanent financing model for the Community. The chronology of events is particularly interesting in the period between the passing of Financial Regulation no. 25 in the Council of Ministers on 14 January 1962 – the regulation popularly known for having instituted ‘financial solidarity’ in the Community – and the January 1963 veto. During 1962, the Financial Regulation became entangled in the enlargement negotiations with Britain, at the same time as serious internal tensions over this Regulation were building up among the Six. 

This paper shows, through the presentation of a broad range of new archival materials, that the French, as self-appointed leaders of both sets of negotiations, were close to losing control over the direction of the financing negotiations when the would-be paymasters in both Germany and Britain appeared highly reluctant to embrace the particular financing model promoted by the French in concert with the European Commission. It is primary Milward’s 2002 analysis that promotes financing as the decisive point that led de Gaulle to act so resolutely in January 1963.​[8]​ This paper supports Milward’s analysis, as its findings derive from completely different primary sources.​[9]​ In most accounts of these events, the issue of financing is treated as present, but also as a subsidiary issue of the CAP​[10]​. This new research shows that the question of financing took on a life of its own during 1962. The history of financing the Community is one that has not been told at length yet.


Basic issues of financing the Community

It is necessary for the long-term stability of any political institution to have a permanent source of financing. From 1958, the Community was financed through direct member state contributions following a financial burden-sharing key laid down in article 200.1 of the Treaty establishing the EEC. Accordingly, Germany, France and Italy were to cover 28 per cent of Community expenditure, the Netherlands and Belgium 7.9 per cent, and the small member state of Luxembourg a mere 0.2 per cent. This burden-sharing key was roughly based on the relative size of each member state, and correlating to voting weights assigned in the Council of Ministers. 

Article 201 EEC opened the possibility of switching to another model for financing the Community, namely by creating ‘own resources’; a direct albeit poor translation of the French resources propres. Own resources is a Community-technical term that refers to a source of revenue that flows automatically to the Community, and hence does not depend on the will of the member state governments. The Treaty stipulated that own resources could be instated from the revenue generated from the common customs tariff, once introduced, as well as from the external agricultural levy created in relation to the CAP. The formal procedure for enacting article 201 EEC was the Community method, that is, on proposal from the Commission, on decision by the Council, acting after advice from the European Parliament. The Treaty article stipulated also that each member state should adopt it “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. It meant that the introduction of own resources would have to go through national parliamentary recognition, and could not be enforced solely through a top-down Council regulation or directive. The additional national procedure for the creation of own resources was, no doubt, placed in the Treaty due to the symbolic importance of giving up national taxes, so central to modern state authority; this procedure, however, played hardly any role in these early policy discussions.

Among the landmark decisions adopted by the Council on 14 January 1962 was Financial Regulation no. 25 which created the key financial instrument of the Community’s budget: the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, perhaps better known by its French acronym, FEOGA).​[11]​ Regulation no. 25 has typically been seen as the first step towards the introduction of own resources according to article 201 EEC; at the time of implementation, however, there was some ambiguity about this, as this paper will show. FEOGA was to cover Community expenditure regulated by the CAP such as agricultural guarantees, export refunds, and structural improvements. The Regulation stipulated that FEOGA was, on a gradually incremental basis, to be fed by the revenue accrued from the common external agricultural levies. At the same time there would be a gradual scaling down of the direct member state contributions. Whereas the Regulation did mention that at the common market stage the revenue from the common agricultural levies would become a budgetary resource for the Community, it only made specific provisions for the period until the end of the second stage of the common market in 1965. The political interpretation of this ambiguity in the legislative act became central to events that followed. 

On 14 January 1962 the Council also adopted the central framework regulations for the CAP that essentially directed the categories of expenditure for the Community. Interestingly, none of the regulations adopted on 14 January 1962 were accompanied by actual financial projections of how much these were expected to cost, as political projects that incur costs typically are. Nonetheless, even in the absence of formal estimates, it was not difficult to project, as most did, that the gradual switch to own resources as the method of financing the CAP would alter the burden-sharing among the member states that their parliaments had initially signed up in article 200.1 EEC. On the one hand, the introduction of an agricultural levy-based own resource would impose a system whereby net importing member states would have to surrender to the Community a traditional source of revenue from their frontier tariffs. An early Commission report stated boldly that with the introduction of own resources these receipts would have “perdu absolument tout caractère national, afin de faire face aux différents besoins nécessité par la politique commun” .​[12]​ On the other hand, the CAP regulations – above all the Grain Regulation no. 19 – meant that funds could flow to a member state primarily from the CAP’s common market organisations in the shape of price guarantees and export refunds. 

A rough cost-benefit calculation of a financing model based on own resources coming from the external agricultural levies of the Community would easily place France, as a large agricultural producer and exporter both to other EEC member states and third countries, as the ultimate beneficiary of the system of own resources. Member states with net agricultural imports from within and outside the Community, that is Germany followed by the Netherlands and Italy, would directly and indirectly become the main donors of the common project.​[13]​ In fact, own resources were promising to be such a good financial deal for France that its Minister for Agriculture, Rochereau, in November 1960 announced that,

“parmi les mécanismes communautaires, le système des prélèvements apparaît comme une pièce maîtresse des propositions de la Commission”.​[14]​

In this light, it is not surprising that the politics of financing the Community, and the debate over the introduction of own resources, split the positions of the member states into two main groups: those who ‘would have to pay’ – that is, Germany, often supported by the Netherlands and Italy - and those who would become net beneficiaries, that is, France. The net financial result for Belgium was projected to be fairly neutral. If Britain ever joined under a system of own resources, she was likely to be “paying much more into the Community budget than she was ever likely to receive in the form of EC funds” , because this country imported more food from outside the Community than all of the Six put together.​[15]​ 

Whereas the overall positions of the key actors in the negotiations for financing the Community as described above are fairly predictable and well-known, the unusual procedure through which Regulation no. 25 was created is not. Nor are the political implications inside the Community that ensued from this procedure. That narrative will unfold in the following sections. 


The peculiar birth of Regulation no. 25

The unusual trait surrounding the birth of the Financial Regulation is that it defied Community procedure to the extent that it had not originated as a legislative proposal in the Commission prior to the Council meeting where it was adopted. The Commission may actually never have intended to create a separate financing regulation prior to the 60th Council meeting, beginning on 18 December 1961. By comparison, the Draft Proposal that became Grain Regulation no. 19 had already been sent out to the member states at the end of May 1961, providing ample time for consultation within governments.​[16]​ Financial provisions were directly incorporated into the Draft Regulations for the CAP, and the Draft Grain Regulation was seen as the model for other CAP common market organisations.

The political preparation among the member states for the conclusion of the first stage of the implementation of the common market with respect to the CAP had been delayed during the fall of 1961, not least because Germany was facing elections. Hence, considering the important decisions to be taken by the end of 1961, the Council was ill-prepared at the beginning of the 60th Council meeting. The result was a meeting that was unusually long-drawn, confusing, and the final decisions were unclear on many points.​[17]​ 

The Council experienced several deadlocks over key issues during its ‘marathon’ meeting from 18 December 1961 to 14 January 1962.​[18]​ This was certainly also the case in relation to the provisions over financing the CAP. In response, an ad hoc working group was created during the Council meeting for reviewing the financial issues of the CAP. On 28 December a separate proposal for financing the CAP emerged. It was presented as a temporary solution, namely as a three-year agreement whose provisions covered until 1965.​[19]​ The details of how the ad hoc expert group worked remains obscure, but earlier (and later) sources give reason to believe that German hesitance towards the financial provisions – as well as other provisions – of the Draft Grain Regulation were dominating. 

The German hesitance had been twofold. Firstly, the German delegation had submitted a note in late November stating reluctance to accepting the institutional positioning of the FEOGA within the realm of the CAP and each of the common market organisations.​[20]​ This reluctance was repeated in a working document that the Commission transferred to the Special Committee on Agriculture the day prior to the 60th Council meeting.​[21]​ At this point, however, the Germans did not try to separate the financial provisions from the Draft Grain Regulation. Rather, the German aim was to broaden the notion of financial solidarity away from just the CAP to the Community in general. Secondly, on December 20, the German delegation submitted a proposal to the Council in which it showed agreement to the principle of recettes communautaires providing that the financial burden-sharing would still follow what was laid down in article 200.1 EEC.​[22]​ Germany wanted to assure that its maximum contribution would never go above the 28 percent agreed in the EEC Treaty. If these sources give the essence of Germany’s position, the fact that a Draft Financial Proposal emerged on 28 December is a partial victory to Germany who wanted it removed from the Draft Grain Regulation. It is important to notice that the Draft Financial Proposal had not been given any legal shape (regulation, directive or resolution) yet. In it, Germany did not manage to insert a maximum ceiling in the Draft Proposal, and it showed impossible to get this concession through later, as it tried to do in the final hours of the Council meeting on 13 January 1962.​[23]​ 

After three weeks of exhaustive negotiations in the Council, the resulting text was one that both France and Germany were able to accept. France hinged its hopes to the fact that own resources were the stated aim of the Community’s financing model. Germany seemed contented with two points. Firstly, that Community financing was now not only about the CAP, and, secondly, that the Financial Regulation was a temporary one. There had been very little time for consultation over the draft regulation within the participating governments before it was approved in the Council of Ministers. The hastened preparation of the Financial document also seems to have meant, at least for the German delegates, that they had not fully understood the legal status and implications of the document until after the Council meeting, as the next section will show. Seen in the long run, of course, an important long-term implication of the removal from the Draft Grain Regulation of the financial provisions was that there was no direct legal connection between the Community expenditure in the CAP regulations, and the way in which these regulations were to be financed. 


Conflicting interpretations of Regulation no. 25.

After the January 1962 meeting, Edgar Pisani, the French Minister for Agriculture, declared triumphantly on behalf of the French government that: 

“Les prélèvements perçus à la frontière commune sur les importations en provenance de pays tiers constituent une ressource propre de la Communauté. De ce fait, cette affectation des prélèvements devra être entérinée par chacun des Etats-membres, conformément à ses règles constitutionnelles propres ce qui implique, dans certains pays, une approbation parlementaire. Les Six pays de la CEE se sont déjà engagés à mettre en oeuvre dès à présent la procédure prévue à l’article 201 du Traité afin que ce corollaire essentiel de la préférence communautaire au sein du marché unique puisse entrer en vigueur dès la fin de la période de transition”.​[24]​ 

It was clear that the French government wanted to argue that own resources had now entered the acquis communautaire through Financial Regulation no. 25. And that the road to introducing them was irreversible. The formal wording of Regulation no. 25, however, did not make this so evident, because it only stipulated the possibility of making agricultural levies into own resources at the end phase. 

In Bonn, the opinion was somewhat different to the French, and a gradually growing resistance against Regulation no. 25 was spurred on by only a few people in the Federal Finance Ministry who had understood for quite a while that own resources would turn out to be a bad deal for Germany. Already in February 1960, the Finance Ministry had urged the Federal government to come up with a coordinated opinion about the destiny of the revenue from the external agricultural levies of the EEC.​[25]​ The request was overheard, and the influence of this Ministry remained marginal in Germany’s EEC policy for still some time. Subsequently, the German government voted in favour of the Resolution passed by the Council of Ministers in December 1960 expressing political agreement to establishing common market organisations as the central pillar of the CAP, and the institution of a system of agricultural levies. The Resolution made reference to the possibility - not decision - that the levies could accrue to the Community to cover the expenditure for the CAP and Community activities after the end of the transition period.​[26]​ Prior to the Resolution, there had hardly been any reactions in the German administration to the eventual cost of the Community. In fact, at that time only the French seem to have been actively engaged in getting the December 1960 Resolution passed. Olivier Wormser, the Director of Economic Affairs in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was so keen on this that he was personally willing to meet his German colleagues to ascertain that the Germans did not have outstanding issues that could block the Resolution.​[27]​ Wormser’s concern for the German position was most likely caused by the seeming unpredictability of Werner Schwarz, the German Agriculture Minister, who in turn was heavily influenced by the domineering German farm group, the Deutsche Bauernverband.​[28]​ Wormser got his meeting with the Germans, and must have been satisfied with the answers that he received, because afterwards he triumphantly wrote in a note that the German government, 

“a enfin accepté, conformément au souhait de la France, l’affectation intégralement communautaire du prélèvement au stade définitif et, pendant la période préparatoire, l’affectation progressive du prélèvement à des actions communes dont il pourra être convenu” .​[29]​

It is important to note that a Resolution is not a legally binding instrument according to the Treaty, although, as a soft legal instrument it certainly displayed a political commitment.

Own resources were not mentioned again until they appeared in the Commission’s Draft Grain Regulation at the end of May 1961. This document mentioned, as pointed out above, that the expenses from the various support measures at the agricultural market should be covered progressively by the Community. When this Commission document landed on the desk of Mr. Hartig, Director in the Federal Finance Ministry, he began a tireless crusade to halt Germany’s commitment to the introduction of own resources. Unfortunately, apart from scattered archival remains, little is known about Hartig who became such a passionate guardian of German finances. 

In the first place, Hartig tried to persuade the Agriculture Ministry to submit German counter-proposals for the financing aspect of the Commission’s May Draft Grain Regulation.​[30]​ When the Agriculture Ministry refused to do so, an angered Hartig wrote directly to the German delegation in Brussels to alert them that, 

“ … from German side, no position has yet been taken towards the financial provisions of the draft regulations (…). Accordingly there is no agreement between, on the one hand, the Agriculture Ministry, and on the other, the Federal Finance Ministry, as well as other relevant departments, about the financial provisions of the draft regulations and about any German counter-proposals”.​[31]​ 

The Ministry for Agriculture, in turn, defended its rejection of Hartig’s attack by referring to the likely reactions of the Deutsche Bauernverband – a perceived core electoral group to the government – if Germany negotiated over financing before it had even created the CAP: 

“If the Federal Republic agrees to a common financing already now, it can expect a severe criticism from German agriculture, if Federal funds are being used to finance interventions in other member states and agricultural exports (…)”.​[32]​ 

The Agriculture Ministry, which was totally uninterested in financing, nonetheless assured the Federal Finance Ministry that it would prefer to stay with the financing model of member state contributions, and that it was against letting revenue from levies become own resources to finance the CAP. It concluded unilaterally that there was no major discrepancy between the opinions of the two ministries.​[33]​ Of course, they were not in agreement. Subsequently, this disagreement internally in the German administration meant that no coherent position regarding the issue of financing or own resources emerged from the side of the German government prior to the important December 1961 Council meetings where the Commission’s draft was scheduled for discussion and adoption.​[34]​ 

Still, trouble broke out when the Federal Economics and Finance Ministries discovered what the German delegation had agreed to in the 60th Council meeting. Technically, a Regulation is the strongest legal instrument of the Community because it is binding upon the member states in its entirety, as well as being directly applicable in the member states.​[35]​ In Bonn, the expectation had been a financing agreement in the form of a less binding legal instrument, for instance a declaration of intent over own resources, or another resolution.​[36]​ Günther Harkort, the German Permanent Representative to the Community, had to account for why the delegation had failed at the 60th Council meeting: 

“The question of whether to give the Financial Regulation the shape of a Decision or a Regulation was open from the outset. Not until the very last stage of the discussion did the Council decide to choose a Regulation. With it, all the delegations agreed to an additional mention in the minutes of a ceiling for the contributions for the first three years of the transition period. (…) The Permanent Representatives have explicitly declared that their governments legally recognise the ceilings mentioned in the minutes. The ceilings have therefore again been guaranteed beyond doubt”.​[37]​

Harkort was wrong about the guaranteed ceiling, but the German delegation had actually made several attempts to get such a financial ceiling for Germany included in the Regulation, as several documents in relation to the 60th Council meeting bear witness to.​[38]​ Economics Minister Erhard therefore attempted a new procedure: he wanted to try and change the legal status of Regulation no. 25 before the final linguistic corrections and legal proving had been made, a process that was expected to take three to four months.​[39]​ The German Permanent Representative therefore placed a reservation on Regulation no. 25 with the view of examining the text in more detail before finally approving it.​[40]​ 

An internal letter in the Economics Ministry explained the unusual birth of the Regulation. It said that because the Regulation had not been handled from draft and committee meeting hearings and legal services following the usual legislative procedure, mistakes had happened during the heated negotiations in Brussels.​[41]​ The biggest mistake was possibly that Regulation no. 25 did not mention a financial ceiling for Germany’s contribution. The note reiterated that the Federal Finance Ministry had demanded such a ceiling prior to the Council meeting, and had the Economics Ministry been present in the Council, it would also have insisted on this. In the Federal Finance Ministry, questions were asked about how such a mistake could possibly have occurred.​[42]​ An explanation that circulated the inner circle of the ministry was that perhaps a linguistic mistake had happened in-between its previous report and the Brussels negotiations. It was noted that the report referred to Verordnung, which in German translates to both ‘rule’ in the general sense and ‘regulation’ in the Community-legal sense. Perhaps the German delegation had misunderstood the French documents? Whatever the reason for the blunder, the Economics and Finance Ministries in concert decided, firstly, to create an inter-ministerial investigation of the situation, and secondly, to push for reopening of these negotiations in Brussels. Neither proved successful, as we will see below. Like so many other inter-ministerial meetings in Adenauer’s administration, this one ended in disagreement over how to approach the issue, and proved utterly unconstructive.​[43]​ 

On his side, Permanent Representative Harkort promised to address the matter in Brussels again, though he personally expressed doubts about this undertaking. Harkort believed – correctly as it turned out - that it was already too late.​[44]​ When he did not achieve anything through this procedure, Heinz Starke, the German Finance Minister, personally went along to the next Council meeting.​[45]​ Aided by Rolf Lahr, State Secretary in the German Foreign Affairs Ministry, Starke demanded the negotiations of Regulation no. 25 reopened, and a maximum contribution percentage for Germany inserted. Lahr also attempted to show that there had been a linguistic confusion and the German delegation had not initially understood the financial responsibility of the agreement.​[46]​ With French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville chairing the meeting it is not surprising that the Germans could have saved themselves the belated effort.​[47]​ 

A final unsuccessful protest was delivered by State Secretary for Economic Affairs, Alfred Müller-Armack, at the time of approving the final translations of Regulation no. 25 in early April 1962.​[48]​ As a minimum, he was allowed to insert a unilateral German statement in the minutes of that meeting, stating that the German government considered that “la déclaration insérée au procès-verbal sur la plafond de la contribution comme une proposition de même valeur juridique”. And after this, the French delegation mocked the Germans by inserting another unilateral statement saying that Community law grants no legal status to unilateral statements inserted in minutes. On the basis of this ‘agreement to disagree’ the members of the Council gave their unanimous approval to Regulation no. 25. The ministers parted with different interpretations of what Regulation no. 25 really meant for the future of the Community, in terms of the future role of levies, the end of the transition period, and the legal status of Germany’s unilateral statement about a financial ceiling for contributions to the financing of the Community. The implications of this mess on Britain’s future as a member state, was equally unclear at this point.


The Financial Regulation and the accession negotiations

Financial Regulation no. 25 was now part of the acquis communautaire, and thus part of the Community’s legal body that prospect member states would also have to accept upon accession. During the spring 1962, the British government was asked by the Commission and the French Presidency to send an official response to the new agreements. Off the record, it had been no secret that the British were generally unhappy with the Community agreements concluded on 14 January 1962, and at the bottom line, British concerns referred to the issues of the financing regulation.​[49]​ The official British response avoided commenting directly on article 201 EEC, and instead noted that Britain was prepared to contribute in a similar fashion as other large member states following the burden-sharing in article 200 EEC.​[50]​ After delivering this message to the Community, Pierson Dixon, the leader of the British delegation at the official’s level and British ambassador to France, noted that, “It was clear from remarks made outside the meeting that our remarks on this point had caused surprise and some alarm”.​[51]​ Such British signals, of course, went contrary to the French wish for an unobstructed implementation of article 201 EEC and own resources. Subsequent French diplomatic maneuvers aimed at ensuring that the link between the common market and the agricultural levies would be maintained also after the expiry of Regulation no. 25.​[52]​ 

When the enlargement negotiations resumed in early August, the Financial Regulation took centre-stage. Harold Macmillan, the ministerial leader of the British delegation, started out by acknowledging Regulation no. 25 as an acceptable basis for further negotiations, and therefore signaled a more reconciling view than the one expressed by Pierson Dixon before the summer. This, however, was not sufficient for some, and the British negotiators faced a rather hostile attempt to try and enforce the French view of what should happen after 1965 in this area led by two Frenchmen, namely Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, and French Commissioner Robert Marjolin.

In this connection, a meeting among the Six EEC member states in the evening of 4 August developed into the first direct internal confrontation over the way in which the accession and financing negotiations were handled. When the German delegation expressed reluctance towards the French strategy, Marjolin defied procedure for Commission competences. Hence, he “redrafted the French motion as a Commission proposal put forward by Robert Marjolin”, which was a move that upset the German delegation so much that it chose to “reveal what had happened in the meeting to their British counterparts”.​[53]​ This helped little. In the absence of a clear German counter-initiative, Marjolin’s paper proceeded into the enlargement negotiations with Britain in the early morning hours of 5 August. At this time, most delegates had gone to bed or even collapsed, as happened also to the Luxembourg chairman of the meeting, Eugène Schaus. Edward Heath, who was the Lord Privy Seal and head of the British enlargement delegation, has described the events with a mix of disappointment and anger:

“A little before 4 a.m., the French unexpectedly demanded that we should sign a paper on financing the CAP, committing us to an interpretation of the financial regulation favourable to the French. (…) This action was self-evidently dilatory in intent, and I refused to be bounced into a snap judgment on such a complex matter. I was supported in this by the Germans and the Dutch, who were as irritated as I was. The French redrafted the document twice, but this only hardened my resolve. This was no way of carrying out such important negotiations, and I was having none of it”.​[54]​

At 6.30 a.m., the negotiations had produced no result, and were adjourned until the autumn. The unorthodox French manouvre was clearly a traumatic event for the British. Ambassador Dixon noted in his diary that the night between 4 and 5 August marked “the end of the Brussels negotiations”.​[55]​ According to the main biographer of Macmillan, Dixon had been forewarned “in confidence” by a French official that “Couve had informed the other Five that the French were going to ‘wreck’ the negotiations by refusing any concessions over the financial negotiations”. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Forthomme, later told the British that they “had done great damage by not allowing the financial regulation to be settled in August”.​[56]​ Throughout this political process, the Belgians showed a tendency to support the French view. 

While the Germans had not stood up to the situation in Brussels at the time, the incidence triggered strong reactions in the Federal Finance Ministry. The document that had been presented to the British in the early morning hours of 5 August was here referred to as the Marjolin Paper. It was viewed with great skepticism, as another French attempt to draw own resources into the acquis communautaire. Obviously, so German Finance experts reasoned, if the French succeeded in forcing the British to accept own resources, the matter would practically be settled, and Germany could not resist their introduction. The French clearly had similar expectations. 

Finance Minister Starke and his Director Hartig, however, still found themselves in a rather isolated position within the Federal administration, as if they were the only people to fully appreciate that if implemented in the way that the French government and Commissioner Marjolin wanted, Regulation no. 25 would be a poor financial deal for Germany. Their fears were well-grounded, considering the almost unchecked process whereby own resources moved into Community legislation: from the December 1960 Resolution to article 2 of Regulation no. 25 which directly accepted further elaboration of article 201 EEC. No one else in the German government seriously reacted against this.​[57]​ The German government had in January 1962 most likely agreed to transfer the revenue of levies from imports of agricultural products from third countries to the Community to cover common expenditure at the stage of the common market. It had also accepted that agricultural exporters would receive subsidies for certain agricultural products in some of the other agreements regarding the CAP. In addition, the leaders of the Finance Ministry were furious over the fact that the German negotiators had not assured, at the very least, the insertion of a financial ceiling for Germany’s future contribution to the EEC. 

After the night of the Marjolin Paper, Hartig addressed the matter in a long note intended for the Cabinet. He pointed out that, “The real purpose of this Paper is to undermine the use of article 201 of the EEC Treaty for transfers of revenue from levies from the member states to the Community” .​[58]​ In Hartig’s view, the Marjolin Paper was an attempt to sneak in via the back door an agreement to own resources that both the applicant countries and the EEC partners subsequently would have to accept. He described Marjolin as the Vertrauensmann, the confidant, of the French government in the Commission, and suggested that Marjolin had transgressed the ‘neutrality’ of Commissioners and drawn up the paper on the basis of instructions directly from Paris. Moreover, Hartig pointed out that the State Secretaries Rolf Lahr and Alfred Müller-Armack, and the German permanent representative to the Community, Günther Harkort, were responsible for not standing up to the French move at the right time. Hartig accused his colleagues of simply not understanding properly the legal and financial implications of own resources for Germany. Hartig was disgusted by the French strategy, as he saw it:  

“The presentation at night of the paper and its discussion in the narrowest of circles belongs, of course, also the arsenal of the well-known French negotiation tricks”.​[59]​

This view was shared by Finance Minister Starke who, in a letter to the Chancellery, explained that:

“The attempts by the French clearly aim to commit the English to Regulation no. 25 from 14 January 1962 (…) There is no basis for the French demands of wanting to oblige extensively the other member states and in particular the Federal Republic as it has nonetheless already happened in the agricultural financing regulation. That demand is not legitimate”.​[60]​ 

Clearly, the night of the Marjolin Paper was not only traumatic to the British, but to the Germans too. Starke insisted that the Chancellery and German government face up to the realities of the state of the Community negotiations. Starke went further, when he on 10 October personally presented the case to the Cabinet. He outlined carefully the financial prospects for Germany if article 201 EEC was introduced into Community legislation according to the French plan.​[61]​ At the Cabinet meeting, Chancellor Adenauer reacted to Starke’s warnings by talking generally about the Community and the importance of a successful outcome of the negotiations with Britain. The Chancellor obviously showed an outright disinterest in the case, as he so often did when faced with economics and dry technical matters. Starke did however manage to make the Chancellor raise the matter with the German members of the European Commission, and President Hallstein was mentioned as a key contact. Starke moreover managed to persuade his colleagues to take a Cabinet decision to reject the Marjolin Paper as basis for further accession negotiations with Britain. Representing the Economics Ministry at the meeting, Müller-Armack noted that he now for the first time saw the situation in full:

“Behind the [Marjolin] proposal is the political purpose that Germany will have to pay a price to France for the accession of England”.​[62]​

Foreign Minister Schröder later thanked Starke for his warnings.​[63]​ 

The French, however, hardened their efforts to proceed with getting own resources accepted through the enlargement with Britain. Just as the Germans had finally realised what the French were up to, the French knew that convincing the Germans to accept the Financial Regulation was key to progress. Towards the end of October, the two French top officials Bernard Clappier, leader of the French enlargement negotiation delegation, and Director-General Olivier Wormser met in Bonn with the German Foreign Affairs Secretary of State, Rolf Lahr, with the explicit aim of persuading the Germans to accept the link between the successful ratification of British accession and full implementation of the Financial Regulation. Lahr refused, and subsequently wrote to some of his colleagues that he had had made it clear to the French that neither the Germans nor the British were willing to accept the French interpretation of the Financial Regulation.​[64]​ Lahr’s letter mentioned the word mißtrauen, mistrust, several times, referring to the procedure that the French had pushed forward. Given the value and prestige attached to the Financial Regulation by the French, he speculated that if the Financial Regulation was rejected

“the negotiations with Great Britain can enter a state of serious crisis”.​[65]​

Engineered by Hartig, Finance Minister Starke now made a move to try and assure that his department be represented in all foreign affairs meetings where the issues of financing the CAP, own resources, and enlargement, were to be discussed. Starke directly warned his colleagues in the government that he believed that the French 

“will undoubtedly not hold back from artificially provoking a serious crisis in the negotiations with Great Britain”.​[66]​

At this time, there was little doubt that Starke had convinced his colleagues in the governments about the need to assure that Britain did not commit to own resources via accepting the French interpretation of article 201 EEC and Regulation no. 25.​[67]​ A new note from the Federal Ministry of Justice supported Starke’s interpretation.​[68]​ But the problem was still how to break it to the French without the Germans or British being seen as the source of an eventual crisis. Moreover, as one top official in the Federal Treasury recognised, “the French mostly manage to isolate the German delegation” in the accession negotiation.​[69]​

By mid-November, Starke asked the Brussels delegation to make the French aware that Germany would not accept any new negotiations within the EEC that did not involve a fair burden distribution for Community financing.​[70]​ Yet a meeting at the Federal Finance Ministry a few days later showed that there was some uncertainty about how to approach the situation.​[71]​ It seemed clear to leading voices in the Ministry that the message to the French was likely to provoke problems, possibly termination of the accession negotiations. They questioned whether this outcome was desirable, especially if Germany really was too late to avoid the automatic introduction of own resources by the end of the transition period. In that case, it was noted, British membership would give Germany someone to co-finance the Community with.​[72]​

From the point of view of financing, the Dutch government was facing a situation not unlike that of the Germans. The Dutch, however, may have been less inclined to confront the French directly with the financial question at this point for at least two reasons. Firstly, the Dutch were unlikely to try and endanger the full creation of the CAP by upsetting the French on the issue of financing.​[73]​ Secondly, British accession to the Community promised the reward of direct access of Dutch farm products to British agricultural markets. Nevertheless, from the fall 1962, discontent was also brewing within the Dutch administration specifically with relation to French procedure and the Financial Regulation

“the French delegation will not yield an inch on this issue. (…) sur ce point la délégation française sera très très fermée”.​[74]​

In a report to the Dutch Council of Minister from mid-October 1962, Foreign Minister Joseph Luns expressed that he was increasingly reluctant to accepting a model in which the Dutch would become permanent net financers of the Community along with Germany and Britain.​[75]​ Within the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry there was a growing reluctance to accept that the French unilaterally was forcing such an unfavourable deal through the Community against the explicit wishes of at least three countries.​[76]​ Moreover, several of the Dutchmen involved were beginning to view the procedure with which the situation had developed as a bad omen for future cooperation in the Community. The Dutch Permanent Representative tried for a short while to mediate between the French, Germans and British views, but it proved to be unsuccessful.​[77]​ Towards the end of November, Dutch Foreign Ministry officials also tried contacting the Commission directly to make it revise the documents regarding the financing issue used in the negotiations with Britain.​[78]​ Also this proved to be unsuccessful, not least because also the Commission itself was internally split over the procedure to follow.​[79]​ 

In the Commission, Marjolin insisted on upholding his Paper initially introduced in the enlargement negotiations – thus siding with the French government - whereas Hallstein and von der Groeben, at least in principle, tended to side with the German government. In fact, in a note to the other Commissioners in mid-November von der Groeben brought up the procedure for the issue of financing in order to try and face the mounting political problems surrounding the British accession negotiations.​[80]​ He noted that among the member states, the French stood alone with wanting to implement article 201 EEC at the time of the British accession. The main reason for this resistance, so von der Groeben noted, was the unjust financial burden-sharing in the Community that the French interpretation so obviously would lead to. At about the same time, Hallstein made similar observations about the dispute among the Six over the financial regulation, not only between the Six and Britain.​[81]​

During December the negotiations appear to have been even more confusing than previously, as it was becoming unclear who needed to negotiate with who: was this above all an internal affair that needed to be solved between the Six, or could the matter be solved directly in the connection with the British accession negotiations?​[82]​ The German and Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministries were now in frequent contact over this.​[83]​

In the German government, control of the situation was on the point of disappearing, had there ever been full control over it, in the eternal disputes among the ministries over competences. Foreign Affairs State Secretary Lahr sent his personal version of a compromise proposal to the four other EEC governments and the British, but not to the French. Lahr suggested that whatever agreement made between the Six and Britain during the accession negotiations should not have general validity for the Community afterwards.​[84]​ It soon transpired, however, that Lahr had not consulted the rest of the German government on this. The Federal Finance Ministry in particular objected to both what they saw as an inappropriate procedure of excluding the French in this kind of communication, and the content of Lahr’s message. Notwithstanding this early disagreement on procedure, this seems to have been the time when the German administration was ready to confront the French. During the week leading up to President de Gaulle’s press conference, German State Secretary Lahr informed the French Director-General Wormser that the German government would definitely not accept the documents on which France wanted to base the financing agreement with Britain. 







The narrative presented above has delivered considerable new circumstantial evidence in support of the argument that the British membership application failed over the controversies over finding a financial model for the Community. It was a dispute not primarily between the Six and Britain, but within the Six. The aggressive French promotion of a particular financing model, though a mix of formal diplomatic negotiations and informal pressure, as well as the engagement of French Commissioner Robert Marjolin in this, created an increasing frustration among France’s negotiating partiers. During 1962, Germany, and later Britain and the Netherlands, signaled serious doubts about accepting the French interpretation of Regulation no. 25. By the end of the year, the French must have been aware that the situation, as it had developed, was untenable. As a result, financing was an uncomfortable and unsettled issue both in the accession negotiations and among the Six by January 1963, and it seemed increasingly difficult for anyone to devise an exit strategy. It seems unlikely, however, that the leaders of the German, British or Dutch governments would have acted as abruptly as the French did, although none of the three seems to have known how to solve the problems at hand.

The narrative also tells us about the political process in the Community. Firstly, the incremental way in which financing was introduced lends evidence to the historical institutionalist assumptions about path dependence. Once an issue is introduced into the policy process, it becomes difficult to remove it. This happened with the idea of own resources from the time it was introduced into the December 1960 Resolution. Secondly, it tells us about the informal politics that happened around the time of enlargement negotiations. The treaties do not prescribe a procedure for how to do enlargement, and certainly the sixties was a time for improvised procedures too. The French exploited that to the extreme in this case. 

Thirdly, the narrative tells us about the difficulty of operating with the ‘national interest’ idea, as much of the literature on the Community in the sixties has done. The German administration was notorious for its turf-wars, and it meant that this member state was certainly not prepared to confront the Community effectively. The German acceptance of change in the financing model of the Community – from national contributions to own resources – started out as a strategic error caused largely by the uncoordinated domestic policy process. From this perspective, Adenauer’s willingness to pay for the European project was not grounded in war-guilt, as has often been claimed.

Own resources was discussed in the early sixties only in a narrow sense. The wider constitutional issues, and the involvement of the European Parliament, did not enter the picture before the Commission’s 1965 proposals. Had the Germans (and British) accepted the introduction of own resources through the initial enlargement negotiations according to the French interpretation, it is not clear whether the EP would have  gained an enhanced role in the budget process, as it did later.

The unsettled question of financing the Community during the 1960s meant that it rested on shaky foundations that threatened to collapse it on several occasions. In 1965, when it was time to renew Regulation no. 25, de Gaulle was again ready to paralyse the Community’s high-level decision-making bodies unless Germany agreed to extend Regulation no. 25’s commitment to own resources. When this resulted in yet another temporary agreement over financing, in 1966, the French continued to pursue the issue until own resources were finally introduced in the 1970 Budget Treaty. Only then, was the French ready to accept Britain’s membership. The budgetary package that Britain accepted then was not much different to the one that Britain had been presented in 1962. In turn this sparked a new battle for Britain, namely one of reducing its financial contributions to the Community. 
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